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 This paper attempts to assess the international approach to Internet policy in the 
context of distinctive socio-political frameworks evolving in the US, the European Union 
(EU), and East Asia.  The comparative review will develop a set of underlying structural 
models of the Information Society particular to each region, along with an analysis of 
their defining characteristics in relation to one another.  This examination demonstrates 
how each region, given its regulatory legacy, has elected a different mix of good and bad 
socio-political choices in public policy for the Internet.  Despite the range and diversity 
of paths to e-regulation suggested in these choices, none adequately addresses the 
underlying issue of how to promote an innovative society that is open to broad social 
participation.  The paper evaluates principal weaknesses in these regional models of 
Internet policy and argues the need for re-conceptualizing the cultural, political and 
economic approach to the new information space of the Internet.   
 
What is needed at this historical juncture in the international system, the paper 
suggests, is a complete rethinking of the problems and challenges of the new information 
space in a way that allows its full potential to emerge to the benefit of all sectors of 
economy and society.  The analysis concludes by suggesting the need for a fundamental 
shift in approach to e-regulation for which two arguments are advanced: first, that the 
globalization of the information economy and the internationalization of cyberspace have 
made it imperative that concepts of creativity and innovation be reassessed and 
repositioned at the center of public policy; and second, that the creative and innovative 
challenges of the information economy should reform the emphasis on hardware and 
technological issues by prioritizing the knowledge and creative foundations of society.  
These arguments suggest the need for a fundamental shift in national and international 
policy on the appropriate framework for e-regulation in the Information Society. 
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 This paper attempts to assess the international approach to Internet policy in the 
context of distinctive socio-political frameworks evolving in the US, the European Union 
(EU), and East Asia.  The comparative review will develop a set of underlying structural 
models of the Information Society particular to each region, along with an analysis of 
their defining characteristics in relation to one another.  The paper then evaluates 
principal weaknesses in these regional models and argues the need for re-conceptualizing 
the cultural, political and economic approach to the new information space of the 
Internet.  The analysis concludes by suggesting the need for a fundamental shift in 
approach to e-regulation that may offer a more effective design for the democratic and 
social development of cyberspace. 
This paper examines the emerging Information Society in the U.S., Europe, and 
East Asia, and attempts to show how each region, given a specific regulatory legacy, has 
elected a different mix of good and bad socio-political choices in public policy.  Despite 
the range and diversity of paths to e-regulation suggested in these choices, it is suggested 
that none adequately addresses the underlying issue of how to promote an innovative 
society open to broad social participation.  What is needed at this historical juncture in 
the international system is a complete rethinking of the problems and challenges of the 
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new information space in a way that allows its full potential to emerge to the benefit of 
all sectors of economy and society.  Principal models of the Information Society, 
including their core characteristics, are identified in three regions of the world, followed 
by an argument concerning their inadequacies for the social development of cyberspace.  
This serves as the basis for proposing an alternative e-regulation model with its own 
distinctive set of international policy implications.  
 
MODELS OF THE INORMATION SOCIETY 
 The globalization of the Internet, the digital and wireless revolution, and new 
media and information systems have provoked the creation of an extensive body of 
regulation, law, and socio-economic policy in North America, Europe and East Asia.  Yet 
the approaches taken are not identical or even compatible, and reflect profoundly 
competing conceptions of the information age.  Furthermore, each region is characterized 
by internal conflicts over social and economic priorities and the role of government, 
reflecting contradictory traditions of regulation, information policy, social models, and 
political and constitutional constraints.  A socio-political examination of some of the 
principal models of the Information Society competing for influence in public policy in 
these three regions of the world demonstrates that the form in which information 
technologies evolve are not intrinsically determined but politically and socially shaped.   
 
Inventing E-Regulation in the U.S. 
 The Internet originated in the U.S. from a vision of communication that takes 
three separate directions, each of which is informed by a particular tradition of regulation 
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and a particular view of society and the state.  The special characteristics of the U.S. 
approach to the Information Society can be explained almost entirely by the dominance 
of one vision over others in some areas of policy, or from conflicts among the three 
visions when they overlap or are present in combination in other policies.   
The U.S. approach to the information and communications sector and the 
Information Society emerges from a distinctive social and cultural experience.  This 
experience reflects, at different historical moments, divergent concepts of the individual 
and fundamental rights, the nature of civil society and the market, and the legitimate 
scope of state power with respect to each.  These social, political, and cultural 
conceptions can be organized into three traditions of regulation that are tied to separate 
American theories of the individual, society, and the state (for a more detailed 
examination of these theories and their links to communication policy and law, see 
Venturelli, 1998a). 
U.S. Libertarian Model 
 The libertarian vision of the Internet and communications technology derives 
from a concept of society without the state.  The foundation of the concept can be traced 
to the post-feudal, Anglo-Saxon political ideas of John Locke (1690/1960), Thomas 
Hobbes (1651/1991), and Adam Smith (1776/1986) (for a detailed critique of these ideas 
and their expression in modern communication regulation, see Venturelli, 1998a).  It also 
informs the notion of communication and exchange of ideas that characterized the 
underlying working assumption of scientists and engineers who originated the technology 
of the Internet and wrote its founding codes and protocols (for a brief history of these 
protocols, see Segal, 1995; and Krol, 1992).  In the libertarian view of communication 
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and regulation, the information networks of a society are open and non-proprietary, with 
strict constraints placed upon state intervention on any grounds, even for, what might be 
considered, entirely rational aims, such as the protection of minors.  It is suggested here 
that from the standpoint of a minimal state tradition (see Venturelli, 1998a) that 
libertarian conceptions of information networks represent, the rules of conduct within the 
system are only regarded as legitimate if they evolve from consensus among users and 
participants, with conflicts resolved largely through negotiation and dispute resolution.  
Thus the libertarian view of society and communication is averse to control, regulation or 
monopolization in information space, and supportive of unobstructed processes of 
interaction among individuals.   
Certainly, the intellectual roots of this tradition can be found in Anglo-Saxon 
political theory, but the evolution of the idea, it is argued, is firmly entrenched in the 
American historical experience of the perpetual New Frontier which pervades American 
cultural understanding of the nature and promise of new technology.  New media digital 
and wireless technologies in a networked environment thus become the New Frontier of a 
different space that must be carved and structured by those who utilize and exploit it, and 
not by institutional authorities, proprietary regimes, traditions of law, or the coercion of 
the state.  While the libertarian culture of the Internet is now considered to be more 
descriptive of its genesis than its current structure, this model of the Information Society 
has persisted in many forms, including the continuing struggle to create an open 
architecture and platform for information exchange.  The debate over an Open Source 
Code for music, data, and file sharing, and self-regulatory norms in place of legal codes, 
in more ways than one, represent the resilience of the libertarian paradigm even while it 
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has been gradually overtaken by other, more powerful American models of regulation 
(for a typical example of a libertarian view of cyberspace, see Godwin, 1998; for a 
defense of policies premised in libertarian assumptions, see Lessig, 1999).. 
U.S. Public Interest Model 
 The public interest model, too, has roots in the American experience of social and 
political tensions between the rights of individuals and the boundaries of government (see 
analysis of this tradition in Venturelli, 1998a; for a regulatory history, see Horwitz, 
1989).  However, the public interest model resolves this tension by arguing for, rather 
than against, the application of state power to protect individuals from an even greater 
social threat thought to reside in unaccountable structures of the marketplace.  Ranging 
from the achievements of antitrust law to universal service and consumer protection 
policies, the public interest tradition in the U.S. attempts to balance the interests of 
consumers with those of the industry.  The essential point to emphasize in the lesson of 
this model is that, rather than being founded on a diminished belief in market forces, it is 
founded on the reverse: a faith that perfect markets can, in fact, be achieved by rational 
regulation.  The public interest model assumes that markets can be made to behave as 
classical liberal theory says they should (see further discussion of this in Venturelli, 
1998a, 1997b).  To assure the structures of a functioning market in communications, 
whereby innumerable producers and consumers of a commodity or service are finely 
balanced so that no single market participant dominates, the tradition applies a complex 
body of mechanisms.  These include: competition law, access rules, universal service in 
areas of essential need, educational applications and subsidies, government investment in 
scientific and technological research, privacy protection and protection of minors, 
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unbundling, interconnection, and interoperability requirements, fair use and a limited 
monopoly principle in intellectual property laws, and safety, standards, tariff, and fair 
trade practices, among many other public interest regulations (see Venturelli, 1998a).  
U.S. Liberal Market Model 
 The regulatory tradition in the U.S. that best conforms with liberal economic 
principles--as classically delineated by Adam Smith (1690/1960), and later by its 
intellectual exponents in the modern age, such as Hayek (1944/1994)--emphasizes 
contractual rights and proprietary freedoms for market participants.  The principles 
require a minimum of state intervention in market relations between producers, 
consumers and distributors of goods and services.  Any emergence of monopolies and 
market distortions would be insufficient grounds for inviting state intervention, since 
dominant market entities are regarded as evidence of market success, not market failure 
(see critical examination of the model in Venturelli, 1998a, 1997b).  Inversely, the state 
should also reject all forms of industrial policy to protect or enhance the position of 
national industries.  In short, the liberal market model neither admits the possibility of, 
nor accounts for, the phenomenon of dysfunctional markets, which the U.S. public-
interest model is fundamentally geared to address.  Withholding state power from 
intrusion into market imbalances clearly works to the advantage of structures that are the 
inevitable outcome of unhindered market processes, such as large-scale entities and 
vertical and horizontal consolidation (Venturelli, 1998a, 1997b).  Also termed supply 
side since they are favorable to market leaders, these policies make no legal distinction 
between the rights of artificial entities and the rights of individuals, a feature of the U.S. 
regulatory tradition that is unique among Western industrialized democracies.  A series of 
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judicial decisions in the nineteenth century conferred upon artificial entities the same 
political, property, due process and private rights that the U.S. Constitution till then only 
extended to individual human citizens (e.g., Munn v. Illinois [1876]; Union Pacific 
Railroad Company v. United States [1878]; for U.S. case law extending fundamental 
rights to legal entities, see Killian & Costello (eds.), 1996).  Over time, therefore, the 
speech rights of individuals to be free from the interposition of state preferences, has 
become legally identical to the speech rights of artificial entities such as media 
companies and communications industries.  Under a system of rights equivalency 
between human citizens and artificial entities, the latter may claim the same fundamental 
freedoms in order to preempt government imposed public interest obligations, such as 
obligations to open their electronic space for the airing of candidates views during 
elections, or providing public information to serve the democratic process. 
 The U.S. liberal market model of the Information Society accounts for several 
significant features in the design of U.S. policy, with the underlying common thread of 
governmental restraint in requiring non-commercial obligations from the communications 
industry.  The economic incentive approach to intellectual property (see Venturelli, 2000; 
1998a); for example, is tilted toward contractual extraction of the property right in ideas 
and expression, which is of central importance to the content industry, rather than 
towards public access rights to information or towards author rights of paternity and 
integrity in their creative works.  Under this system, public access rights and author rights 
would be seen as a burdensome and harmful imposition of public interest obligations on 
the content industry, which may lead to higher market costs in the development and 
dissemination of content (ibid.).  Similarly, the absence of strong privacy protection, or 
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the reluctance to impose competition law and open access rules in a consistent and 
rigorous manner in order to remedy infrastructure or content monopolies, are typical 
features of the liberal market model.  The approach is inclined, instead, to encourage 
industry self-regulation in media and communications; few, if any, ownership and market 
share restrictions; elimination of tariff regulations; and abrogation of content regulations, 
even for those classes of information and knowledge that would serve public-opinion 
formation or education (ibid.).  
 The liberal market model differs from the U.S. libertarian model in substantive 
ways, principally with respect to prioritizing the market and proprietary issues in public 
policy.  The liberal market model argues for a more powerful legal regime guaranteeing 
contractual and proprietary rights in the marketplace, whereas the libertarian model 
prioritizes open and unrestricted exchange of ideas and other forms of transactional and 
non-transactional relations among individuals, irrespective of market or proprietary 
imperatives. 
Structural Characteristics of U.S. Policy for the Information Society 
Despite the active and contradictory dynamic of three models competing for 
dominance in public policy, it is nevertheless still possible to identify a few essential 
trends in the U.S. framework for the Information Society.  These trends reflect a mix of 
principles, ideas and assumptions drawn from three separate regulatory traditions and 
social visions.  Taken together, the emerging choices can be said to comprise a distinctive 
socio-political regulatory architecture that defines the U.S. approach to e-regulation 
(prominent examples of these trends can be found in U.S. Congress, 1998, 1996; U.S. 
Venturelli 9
Government, 1999, 1995, 1993; U.S. Internet Council, 2000, among many other policies 
and laws).  Characteristics include: 
• A preference for self-regulatory industry codes 
• The privileging of contractual law over public law 
• Maintaining a low threshold of privacy rights--other than a general 
protection against state intrusion which does not resolve the issue of 
industry and commercial intrusion 
• State-led trade policy begins to substitute for industrial policy 
• A shift from the fair use public access model of intellectual property 
towards the economics incentives model that favors the content 
industry 
• Removing most constraints on vertical and horizontal consolidation of 
media, infrastructure, and information industries 
• Lifting most public interest, non-commercial obligations from the 
content industry, and from the cable and telecommunications 
infrastructure industries 
• Reaffirming constitutional constraints on content regulation in new 
media and cyberspace 
(For a more detailed examination of these characteristics, see Venturelli, 
2000, 1998a) 
 
Inventing E-Regulation in the European Union 
Venturelli 10
 Since the early 1980s, the growing integration of the global economy and the 
expansion of trade liberalization have challenged the very basis of European policy 
toward the communications sector.  Extensive study (see Venturelli, 1998a, also 2000, 
and 1997a) has show that within the European Union (EU), telecommunications and 
audiovisual policies, for instance, have evolved as powerful sites of conflict not only 
between rival political and social interests, but also among rival paradigms of how the 
EU ought to approach the design of the Information Society: the liberal market model, 
the public service model, and the nationalist or culturalist model.  Initiatives launched by 
the European Union have challenged national traditions of communications policy and 
law.  Yet these traditions are proving quite resistant and have transformed, in reverse, the 
Information Society agenda at the European level.   
Two issues should be given serious consideration when examining the EUs path 
to the information age.  First, the European liberal market model and public service 
model should in no way be confused with the U.S. market model or the public interest 
model, since underlying assumptions of society, state, the individual, and the nature of 
policy and law in the U.S. and EU are fundamentally different (Venturelli, 1998a, 1997a).  
Second, just as liberalization has often been oversimplified as a minimum regulatory 
approach when, in fact, it is most often a re-regulatory approach (Venturelli, 1998a, 
1997a, 1997b), so, too, the interventionist or dirigiste state is frequently caricatured as a 
phenomenon of French history, which obscures the real nature of the European approach 
to liberalization of the information sector (ibid.).  Consequently, the EU debate over the 
role of the state in the communications sector is far less about a choice between 
intervention and nonintervention, than it is a contest among three principal forms of 
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intervention and which social model of the Information Society ought to prevail in 
European democracies (ibid.). 
EU Liberal Market Model 
 National regulatory traditions in EU member states have historically followed the 
public service model or the national-cultural model for organizing the structure of 
communications.  Thus the liberal market approach to regulation in the EU does not 
originate at the level of member states, but within the mandate to create a single market 
for goods and services granted to the European Commission by the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1993b).  Yet it was not till the late 1980s 
and early 1990s that the Commission chose to apply this mandate to the communications 
sector (see Venturelli, 1998a, 1997a) through the gradual introduction of privatization, 
deregulation, and competition in audiovisual and telecommunications services (ibid.).  
During the past decade, the mandate has expanded even further to appropriate the entire 
framework for the Information Society (ibid.). 
 The EUs approach to a market model in the information sector favors, for 
example, liberalization of telecommunications networks, a shift from author rights to 
exploiter rights in intellectual property laws, and a move toward self-regulatory codes 
(ibid.).  These are policy positions similar to those found in the U.S. liberal market 
model.  However, a number of core departures in assumptions regarding how the market 
works, the nature of competition, which social needs take priority, and what remedy 
options are open to the state cause the EU liberal market model to display sharp 
dissimilarities with its counterpart in the U.S.  Most important among these, in terms of 
the long-term architecture of e-regulation, is the continued emphasis upon and 
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fortification of, public law as opposed to contractual law.  In the U.S., contractual law is 
ascendant in all market relations and the policies that govern them, with deep roots in 
Anglo-Saxon Common Law.  In the EU, the public law tradition regards contractual law 
as simply one category of private law governing relations between private parties, and in 
no way a constraint upon public law and constitutional principles whose roots lie in 
Roman, Germanic, and Napoleonic legal codes (for a critical examination of these 
traditions and their implications for communication policy, see Venturelli, 1998a and also 
2000, 1997a).   
As noted in a recent study (ibid.), the European public law tradition, now integral 
to the European Union constitutional framework, is conceptually and inherently inclined 
towards privileging the general interest over private, proprietary, or contractual interests 
(see examples of the general interest approach in Commission of the European 
Communities, 1999, 1995a, 1994).  Under such a socio-legal system, industries are less 
able to avert the imposition of general interest obligations than they would be in the U.S. 
where sweeping statutory principles on market processes are rarely undertaken (ibid.).  
Furthermore, and closely related to the issue of public law, are substantive differences in 
the concept of market competition and legitimate market behavior.  The European 
Commission has adopted competition principles for the information sector as steps 
toward sound liberal economic strategy, but because these are guided by a public law 
framework, the general interest is necessarily invoked in each case where competition 
becomes an issue (see Commission of the European Communities, 2000a; for analysis of 
the EU approach to competition, see Venturelli, 1998a).  Whereas the U.S. liberal market 
model regards competition as an autonomic process of the market when the state is 
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excluded and thus not subject to scrutiny as consolidation and imbalances emerge, the EU 
approach to market competition in content and infrastructure industries is to allow a 
broader, more active scope for public intervention in bringing about non-distorted, 
rational structures (Venturelli, 1998a, 2000). 
 Finally, the EU liberal market model has opted for a different set of regulatory 
priorities as compared with the U.S. in its attention to promoting transnational networks 
in data, communication, and content distribution (examples of this focus may be found in 
Commission of the European Communities, 2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1995a, 1993).  This has 
been accomplished by subordinating other priorities which the U.S. market model would 
rank higher, such as:  removing burdensome public interest regulations and ownership 
restrictions, lowering the percentage of state share in infrastructure industries, minimizing 
consumer privacy protection, simplifying licensing rules, and streamlining and making 
more transparent the regulatory and rule-making process (see U.S. perspective on this, in 
U.S. Government, 1999 and United States Internet Council, 2000; for analysis, see 
Venturelli 2000, 1998a).   
 Judging from their respective design of an Information Society framework, it is 
evident that the EU and the U.S. are operating under very different political theories and 
economic assumptions of the how the information marketplace works and by what 
standards its proper functioning should be evaluated. 
EU Public Service Model 
 The public service model that competes against the EU liberal market model and 
delimits its scope is more indigenous to European societies with roots deeply intertwined 
with the modern history of the region (for a detailed examination of this tradition and its 
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significance in communication policy, see Venturelli, 1998a, also 2000).  Similar to the 
differences in market models between the U.S. and EU, the public service model should 
never be confused with the U.S. public-interest model with which it shares few, if any, 
historical and socio-political affinities.  While the U.S. public-interest tradition stems 
from the experience of farmers and labor unions struggling against unregulated corporate 
power during the industrial revolution, eventually leading to the contemporary consumer-
oriented theory of government responsibility, the EU public service model of regulation 
is inextricably bound to the constitutions of European democracies and to the 
fundamental legitimacy of the state.  This is why, it is argued, that the notion of 
interventionism is no longer, nor has ever been, a useful basis for explaining trends in the 
EU, or differences between EU and U.S. methods for addressing policy challenges in the 
digital age (see more discussion of this in Venturelli, 1998a).   
Assumptions about economy and society in the public service model stress the 
constitutional obligations of the legal and legislative system in guaranteeing the 
institutional arrangements for services essential to citizenship and broad citizen 
participation.  Certainly, access to the public communications system has always fallen 
under the category of services essential to citizenship and is regulated on constitutional 
grounds rather than by market or consumer imperatives as it is in the U.S (ibid.).  Just as 
a significant body of ideas in Anglo-Saxon political theory supports the U.S. libertarian 
and market models, so, too, a strong intellectual foundation adds weight to the public 
service tradition (ibid.).  The foundation includes the constitutional, legal, and 
participatory political principles outlined by Montesquieu (1748/1989), Rousseau 
(1755/1973), Hegel (1821/1952) and Kant (1784-97/1991).  The public service model for 
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the Information Society requires that the governing principle of a modern free society 
incorporate not merely the rights of private property, contractual freedom, open 
competition and functioning information markets, but also the rights of citizensnot 
consumers as individuals are categorized in U.S. communications policy.  Citizens 
rights under this EU model would include rights to comprehensive information services 
and to access at all levels in the public communications networks (for examples, see 
Commission of the European Communities, 2000b, 1994; French Government, 1999a, 
1999b; see analysis, Venturelli, 1998a). 
 The public service approach to e-regulation describes not only the French 
constitutional tradition of public policy, but also that of several other states, including, for 
example, Belgium, Italy and Germany (see background in Lasok & Stone, 1987; analysis 
in Venturelli, 1998a).  More to the point, however, the public service model of regulation 
and the statutory responsibility it implies is now explicitly provided for in two 
constitutional provisions of the treaties of the European Union:  Article 2 of the Treaty of 
Rome (Commission of the European Communities, 1993b), and Title 1, Article B of the 
Maastricht Treaty (Commission of the European Communities, 1993b). 
 These constitutional provisions at the member state level and the EU level 
underscore the role of government (both national and transnational) in guaranteeing the 
general welfare of citizens and their access to services essential to participation in society 
and economy.  In terms of Internet regulation, the public service model would stress 
policies with:  universal service guarantees, high standards of privacy protection, 
recognition of author rights and human rights in intellectual property, stringent rules for 
competition, content regulation to ensure production and distribution of information 
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essential to public-opinion formation and to education, standards for quality of 
information networks and services, public investment in research and innovation, 
mandated applications for social services in employment, health care, and social welfare 
(see many components of this framework in Commission of the European Communities, 
2000a, 2000b, 1999, 1995a, 1994). 
 Yet serious questions remain regarding the coherence of the EU Information 
Society framework, since many of the measures adopted under the public service model 
stand in clear conflict with those adopted under the EU liberal market model (see detailed 
discussion of this in Venturelli, 2000 and 1998a).  While the form and nature of these 
inconsistencies are not entirely commensurate with those found in the U.S, the pattern of 
contradictory, self-canceling features of e-regulation in the EU framework parallel those 
in the U.S. framework. 
EU National-Cultural Model 
 The national-cultural model of the Information Society in the EU is a substantive 
departure from the public service approach to communications policy in terms of the 
rights of individuals, the industry, and the primary responsibilities of the state.  As 
examined in a recent study (Venturelli, 1998a), the vision of the national or cultural 
collective as a basis for regulating the information sector is also substantively at odds 
with the liberal market model which favors greater freedom for investors and producers 
from state intervention.  While certainly not unique in international terms, the national-
cultural regulatory tradition is indigenous to European societies and is characterized 
principally by an emphasis on content policy over infrastructure policy.  Communications 
industries are regulated to require carriage of content that celebrates, supports, and 
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enriches the national culture, whose meaning corresponds to the origins and 
construction of the nation state system (for further analysis of cultural policy as 
communication policy, see Venturelli, 2001, 1998a, 1998b).  This strategic priority 
diverges from the central aim in a public service approach which is to ensure universal 
service conditions.  The relationship between the liberal market and nationalist models in 
the politically sensitive content sector is evident in the tensions between liberal versus 
nationalist initiatives for audiovisual policy, content regulation, and program production 
and distribution.  
 It has been argued (Venturelli, 1998a) that a national-cultural model of the 
Information Society advocates the social community as an expressive rather than a 
political or economic unity, one that must be sustained in an uncontaminated and pure 
form.  The expressivist conception of communication policy thus defends the idea of 
culture as its own form, which must be freed from external constraints on its 
development.  Such reasoning is present not only in communication policies of all EU 
member states, but also in the EU constitution and its extensive corpus of laws and 
regulations for the media and information industries (examples may be found in Article 
128 of the Maastricht Treaty, Commission of the European Communities, 1993b, also 
1999, 1995b, 1994, 1989; in addition, European Parliament, 1989).  Cultural provisions 
in the EU treaties reinforce the constitutionality of content regulation to protect culture 
through myriad mechanisms.  These include: state intervention in support of indigenous 
content production; industrial policy strengthening European information industries in 
both infrastructure and content; promotion of program production which invigorates 
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national identity; and reformulation of ownership regulation to retain European 
ownership of cultural industries (ibid.).   
 Despite these serious efforts, the EU has encountered profound difficulties in 
reconciling the principles of creating a transnational information services market (the 
liberal market model) with the aims of promoting cultural identity and growth in 
European content production (the national-cultural model).  One solution would be to 
apply the liberal market model directly to the cultural sphere by treating the latter, from a 
policy standpoint, as an economic category.  As has been noted (Venturelli, 1998a), this 
answer was first suggested by former Commission President Jacques Delors 
(Commission of the European Communities, 1993c) as a way to redefine the cultural 
issue as an economic strategy.  Under this approach, the economic basis of cultural 
production, rather than culture itself, could become the rationale for state intervention, 
thereby creating more consistency and lessening tensions in international trade relations, 
especially with the United States (see discussion of this issue in Venturelli, 1998a).   
 The cultural model of the Information Society has been re-energized, to some 
extent, as EU policies continue to convert cultural goals into economic strategies firmly 
grounded in the treaties and in their mandate for a common marketplace in commodities 
and services.  Regulating economic activities whose forms are cultural is now regarded as 
consistent with EU constitutional and market principles (see Commission of the 
European Communities, 1999, 1995b).  The multimedia and audiovisual policies of the 
EU, for example (ibid., unite European concern for cultural protection with social policy, 
economic policy, and technology policy.  The foremost objective of the cultural-national 
model in e-regulation terms, is to strengthen the European content production industry, 
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ensure that new information services contribute to growth and employment, and look to 
advanced information services as an effective means to address social and cultural 
development of European citizens.  Multimedia services are thus gradually being 
assimilated to broader industrial as well as cultural/social goals, a process that is regarded 
as an important way of fortifying the goals of cultural heritage and cultural cohesion (see 
analysis in Venturelli, 1998a, 1997a).   
The EU is now treating the multimedia content sector as an opportunity to design 
a new legal framework for extending cultural policy goals to the broadband network.  
Nevertheless, from a liberal market standpoint, the national-cultural model erects a dense 
barrier of external, noncommercial burdens for new entrants, thereby distorting the 
processes of actual competition and circumscribing a highly political and nationalist 
matrix for the information marketplace.  This perception has at times led to deep 
differences and tensions in bilateral and international relations, especially between the 
EU and the U.S. 
Structural Characteristics of EU Policy for the Information Society 
 The simultaneous existence of three divergent approaches to the Information 
Society confers a unique character to the European communications market that deviates 
substantially from policies for the digital age evolving in North America or East Asia.  
This points to a separate and distinctive European path to e-regulation and the 
Information Society, with the following core attributes: 
• Persistence of the European social model and political tradition of 
public service regulation as reflected in higher levels of protection for 
individual citizens in cyberspace 
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• Strategic importance of national identity and preservation of national 
culture as a fundamental matter of social solidarity, demonstrated in 
relatively higher levels of content regulation 
• Significance of the European public law tradition that constitutionally 
privileges the general interest and universal access guarantees in 
information infrastructure and services, over proprietary rights and 
contractual freedoms 
• Treating the Information Society as a transnational integration agenda 
• Continued structural resilience of national infrastructure industries, 
such as telecommunications, in the face of liberalization and the 
application of the market model to the information sector 
• Greater willingness to implement competition laws and statutory 
regulations in the information sector than is found under U.S. policy 
 
Inventing E-Regulation in East Asia 
 
 OECD estimates indicate that the Asia-Pacific region, which includes the East 
Asian economies of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Singapore and China, has experienced rapid growth in new information technology in the 
past few years (OECD, 2000).  With 70 million Internet users in a region representing 
half the worlds population, the growth forecast of 200 million users by 2003 will far 
exceed Internet usage rates in North America and Europe.  The region is also 
experiencing dramatic shifts in economic reform, especially with respect to the 
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information sector, which suggests that the East Asian form of an Information Society is 
still unfolding and difficult to characterize.  Even so, as in the case of the EU and the 
U.S., it is possible to identify certain underlying models of society, economy and 
regulation upon which the Information Society and e-regulation framework is likely to be 
constructed.  An outline of at least two such models will be attempted here:  the state-led 
development model, and the liberalized corporate model.  To the extent that neither of 
these can be identified in Europe and North America in exactly or even approximately the 
form they are found here, East Asia has the historic opportunity to evolve a separate 
paradigm and international standard for the information age. 
East Asian Development Model 
 The policy tradition common to East Asia in the past forty years is typified by 
government intervention in industry, labor and credit markets (structural aspects of this 
are described in Yuhn & Kwon, 2000; Tsao, 1985; Nishimizu & Hulten, 1984; Kim & 
Roemer, 1979).  The comparative economic success of the East Asian development 
model when measured against the record in South Asia or other developing regions can 
be attributed, not to intervention since that is a common feature of development policy, 
but to aggressive industrial policy emphasizing:  technology transfer to compensate for 
domestic innovation scarcity; export-led growth to compensate for scarcity of capital; 
strategic use of scarce capital in high productivity industries; protection of domestic 
industries from foreign competition, and coordinated cooperation at all levels between the 
state and industry and among industries and industrial sectors to improve productive 
capacity (ample documentation of these strategies since the 1960s can be found in many 
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sources, including OECD 2000; Yuhn & Kwon, 2000; Tsao, 1985; Nishimizu & Hulten, 
1984; Kim & Roemer, 1979). 
 Predictably, under this model, telecommunications, broadcasting, and the media 
technology sectors have been largely state-owned public monopolies, closely integrated 
into the coordinated government-industry control structures.  There was little, if any, 
scope for stimulating competition and independent innovation to respond to consumer 
needs and demands (Venturelli, 1999; OECD, 2000).  Beginning in the 1980s and 
through the mid 1990s, the inflexible industrial model of economic development began to 
show signs of market distortions and economic recession.  While there are many 
explanations for this decline as accounted for in economic research, it is also argued (see 
Venturelli, 1999) that semi-industrialized countries became unable to look beyond their 
model to examine their excessive reliance on imitative technologies developed in 
countries outside the region.  Nor did they seriously question the low levels of investment 
in technological and service innovation, or the simultaneous emphasis on the ill-
considered strategy of dependence upon heavy industrial conglomerates.  East Asian 
economies had benefited in the past from wage and price advantages and from reliance 
on imported technologies; however, this strategy, as argued here, was completely 
unsuited to an information revolution--not merely a technological revolution--and an 
information economy.   
 The first price paid by the East Asian development model, in terms of the 
structural needs of an information economy, was the telecommunications sector.  
Telecommunications industries in East Asia were characterized by distortions of all kinds 
caused by state intervention, barriers to technological and market development, and 
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insufficient regulation to promote competition and consumer interests (Venturelli, 1999; 
OECD, 2000).   
The second cost of the East Asian development model to an information economy 
was the democratic deficit.  It is argued on the basis of extensive study (see Venturelli, 
2001, 1999, 1998a), that in order for an information and knowledge society to emerge 
and flourish, there are several social and political preconditions that must be met.  These 
preconditions include (for a discussion, see Venturelli, 2001, 1998a):  (1) a functioning 
public sphere (print, electronic, digital, broadband) open to broad participation and 
deliberative engagement among major social groups; (2) a percentage of the public 
communications system capacity reserved for non-commercial exploitation in order to 
strengthen the foundations of civil society and associational development; (3) guarantees 
of citizens information rights through freedom of information laws, government 
transparency, and public service obligations for information providers to serve the public-
opinion formation process; and (4) access to knowledge, information and an educational 
system that cultivates independent judgment instead of rote learning.   
While the diffusion of information technology may alleviate the margins of the 
democratic deficit, there is no necessary relation between information technology and 
participatory democracy which, as argued, is the only form of democracy from which an 
Information Society can successfully evolve (Venturelli, 1998a).  An industrial model of 
democracy that manages on minimal participation through voting rights and 
representative government is no longer adequate to the increased creative and knowledge 
demands of the information age (see a fuller account of this phenomenon in Venturelli, 
2001 and 1999).  Thus without the institutional and regulatory structures to ensure 
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participation and access to knowledge and information, as well as broader foundations for 
civil society, the East Asian economies would be unable to develop and exploit 
information technologies and services in the long run (ibid.).  This, in turn, eventually 
risks endangering their competitive edge in the global economy. 
East Asian Liberalized Corporate Model 
 Following the shift toward economic liberalization and democratization in the 
1980s and 1990s, the East Asian economies began to implement macro-economic 
stabilization plans and shifted their industrial policies (see OECD, 2000; Yuhn & Kwon, 
2000).  The repeal of selective industry promotion laws and reduction in preferential 
credit, tax concessions and price control regulations were welcomed by international 
economic institutions such as the IMF and the OECD.  But it did not significantly reduce 
government intervention in guiding the economy nor abolish state-to-industry or 
industry-to-industry cooperation and coordination.  This paper suggests, then, that one of 
the principal features of the emerging East Asian approach to the information age is the 
continued reliance on a corporatist approach.  Twenty-first century corporatism--which 
also exists in European countries such as Germany--can be noted in East Asian nations 
practices of collaboration rather than competitive rivalry in the economic, state and labor 
sectors.  In ways that cannot be explained or justified by classical liberal economics, this 
collaboration now structurally coexists alongside economic liberalization and partial 
privatization of the information industries in the East Asian region.  For this reason, the 
paper terms the emerging model of the Information Society as the East Asian Liberalized 
Corporate Model.   
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 Evidence for the model may be noted in the implementation of pro-competition 
regulatory reforms in the telecommunications industry (OECD, 2000), which has led to 
universal availability of infrastructure with high penetration rates.  In addition, market 
entry rules for new service providers have been liberalized with few business restrictions, 
especially in the mobile and wireless communications industry (ibid.).  Moreover, most 
East Asian countries have now passed new laws for cyberspace, especially in the areas of 
electronic commerce, digital signatures, and data protection (as an example, see South 
Korean Government, 1999a, 1999b, 1999c).   
 While the region has been remarkably successful in diffusing new media 
technologies, especially in the wireless category (see United States Internet Council, 
2000; OECD, 2000), it is argued that other policy weaknesses remain in the East Asian 
approach to the Information Society, stemming largely from the inability to address 
underlying preconditions and requirements for a knowledge society (see Venturelli, 2001, 
1999, 1998a).  A few examples of structural weaknesses in the information sector 
include:  a high quality and universal educational system but one that is geared to rote 
and imitative learning rather than independent, creative, and critical thinking; an 
underdeveloped regulatory system; and inherent conflicts between the corporatist model 
of collaboration and the requirements for independent, objective and effective regulation.  
Although some nations, such as South Korea and Japan may demonstrate some of the 
highest percentages for Internet usage rates in Asia, the social and economic basis of the 
information sector is still tied far too much to hardware production and distribution than 
to the development of advanced information services.  Thus we note almost the complete 
absence of attention in public policy to develop the content industry, which, as argued 
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below (also, see Venturelli, 2001, 2000, 1999) will be the most critical sector in 
determining wealth creation and social development in the information economy.   
Structural Characteristics of East Asian Policy for the Information Society 
 Sometime within the next few years, there is no doubt that the East Asian region 
will overtake North America and Europe and assume the leadership of the global 
economy in terms of information technology usage rates.  In itself, this will have a 
profound impact on the social, political, cultural and economic development of East 
Asian societies.  The singularities of the East Asian framework for e-regulation in the 
Information Society include: 
• Continued collaboration between industrial actors and state actors sets 
upper limits upon the scope of competition in information 
infrastructure and services 
• Persistence of the export model of economic development in 
information appliances and hardware restrains the pace of domestic 
consumer exploitation of advanced services 
• Tendency to see the Information Society still in industrial terms, bent 
and shaped to fit the old economy of mass produced electronic 
hardware commodities 
• Missing emphasis on content sector growth, with far too much 
emphasis on infrastructure and hardware 
• Continued reliance on imported technologies, and limited investment 
in technological innovation or innovation in creative ideas  
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• Civil society foundations are expanding but are still relatively 
underdeveloped.  There is still scant policy focus on how to promote 
civil society exploitation of information services without which there 
will be no explosion in ideas and innovation (see Venturelli, 2001). 
What should be stressed is this analysis is that given current trends in policy 
choices, the East Asian framework for the Information Society will be a distinctive one, 
with identities all its own.  Yet whether these particularities will be beneficial to 
improving the regions competitive advantage in innovation, creativity, broad social 
participation in information use, and advanced information service development, remains 
to be seen.  As argued (Venturelli 2001, 1999), investment in hardware, infrastructure, 
information appliance technologies, and technological diffusion by themselves alone 
would not resolve the problem of content sector growth, which is the foundation of the 
knowledge economy.   
 
This examination of the emerging Information Society in the U.S., Europe, and 
East Asia has attempted to show how each region, given their regulatory legacies, has 
elected a different mix of good and bad socio-political choices in public policy.  Despite 
the range and diversity of paths to e-regulation suggested in these choices, none 
adequately addresses the underlying issue of how to promote an innovative society that is 
open to broad social participation.  What is needed at this historical juncture in the 
international system, it is suggested, is a complete rethinking of the problems and 
challenges of the new information space in a way that allows its full potential to emerge 
to the benefit of all sectors of economy and society.  The paper concludes, then, with two 
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arguments: first, that the globalization of the information economy and the 
internationalization of cyberspace have made it imperative that concepts of creativity and 
innovation be reassessed and repositioned at the center of public policy; and second, that 
the creative and innovative challenges of the information economy should reform the 
emphasis on hardware and technological issues by prioritizing the knowledge and 
creative foundations of society.  These arguments suggest the need for a fundamental 
shift in national and international policy on the appropriate framework for e-regulation in 
the Information Society. 
 
Creativity, Innovation and the New Information Space:  
Shifting the E-Regulation Debate 
 
 It argued here (see also Venturelli, 2001, 2000, 1999) that creativity and 
innovation should be considered as the key to success in the Information Economy, since 
not merely the sum total of mineral, agricultural, and manufacturing assets, but the ability 
to create new ideas and new forms of expression comprise an invaluable social resource 
base.  Creative wealth can no longer be regarded in the hereditary or industrial terms of 
our common understanding, as something fixed, inherited, and mass distributed, but as a 
measure of the vitality, knowledge, energy, and dynamism in the production of ideas that 
pervades a given community.   
As nations enter the Global Information Society, the greater policy concern 
should be for forging the right environment (policy, legal, institutional, educational, 
infrastructure, access, etc.) appropriate to this dynamism as opposed to engaging in a 
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strategic defense of cultural legacy or of the industrial base.  The challenge for every 
nation is not how to prescribe an environment of protection for a received body of 
cultural or economic capital, but how to construct one of creative explosion and 
innovation in all areas of the arts and sciences (ibid.).  Nations that fail to meet this 
challenge, it is argued, will simply become passive consumers of ideas emanating from 
societies that are in fact creatively dynamic and able to commercially exploit the new 
creative forms.   
 Several considerations are paramount in the innovation debate.  Nation states 
opposed to the protection of content industries, whether in Europe or elsewhere, are about 
to discover, if they have not already, that the cultural conflict over media and audiovisual 
content is not a superficial, high-diplomacy power play between the U.S. and France.  It 
is, instead, about the fate of a set of enterprises that form the core, the so-called gold of 
the Information Economy (Venturelli, 20001, 2000, 1999).  In a feudal, agricultural or a 
mercantile economy, land, agricultural products, and natural resources such as tea, spices 
and gold formed the basis of wealth.  Gold, in particular, has been the objective currency 
of wealth across cultures and nations since ancient times.  In the industrial age, the basis 
of wealth shifted to other mineral resources such as oil, and to the creation of capital in 
plant, equipment, and mass-produced products manufactured from natural raw materials 
such as iron, oil, and wood.  Control over these resources and of the means of 
transforming them into mass-produced products for distribution to ever wider markets 
has been the basis of economic power since the industrial revolution.  The Information 
Society is now changing that equation.  The source of wealth and power in an 
information economy is found in a different type of capital: intellectual and creative ideas 
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packaged and distributed in different forms over information networks.  On might even 
say, that wealth-creation in an economy of ideas is derived far less than we imagine from 
the technological hardware and infrastructure, since eventually most nations, such as 
China, will make investments in large-scale infrastructure technologies.  Rather, this 
paper suggests, prosperity will be dependent upon the capacity of a nation to continually 
create content, or new forms of widely distributed expression, for which they will need to 
invest in creative human capital throughout the economy and not merely in the diffusion 
of gadgets and hardware.   
For instance, every nation will need to have a vibrant audiovisual industry if it is 
to grow its other multimedia content sectors.  In this respect, nations, which attempt 
effectively to prevent the total erosion of content industries, will have an advantage over 
those that simply give up the struggle to the inevitable consolidation of international 
audiovisual producers and distributors.  It is no small irony, then, that many countries 
impervious to the cultural protection argument are now scrambling to find schemes and 
mechanisms to revive their publishing, film and broadcast sectors, even as they seek 
ways to encourage the growth and expansion of new content sectors such as software and 
information services.  Mechanisms for protecting and promoting the cultural industries 
(see Venturelli, 1999, 1998a) include, for example:  lottery systems to subsidize film 
production (UK), taxes on cinema receipts (France), differential postal rates to encourage 
domestic magazine content (Canada), tax levies on commercial publishers to subsidize 
small-scale independent publishers (Germany), and structural funds and tax breaks to 
encourage private investment in content enterprises (Canada, France, Australia, India, 
among others).   
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As many nations have yet to discover, the gap in creative productivity does not 
derive from lower levels of national creative talent or content quality attributes; rather, 
the paper argues, the gap lies in the power to distribute through advertising, marketing, 
control of multiple networks, and from horizontal and vertical concentration with other 
media such as broadcasting, cable, satellite, wireless, and the Internet (Venturelli, 2001, 
1998a).   
Undoubtedly, the Global Internet will and already is, revolutionizing the manner 
in which creative forms, including audiovisual products are distributed and consumed.  
Creative and intellectual property based enterprises and information industries have made 
this assumption or they would not be actively positioning themselves for the 
transformation.  At the same time, the new information industries are rediscovering the 
importance of traditional content sectors such as print publishing and film because these 
enterprises form, it is argued, the creative foundation and feeding line into all the on-line 
content forms.   
In short, a nation without a vibrant creative labor force of artists, writers, 
designers, scriptwriters, playwrights, painters, musicians, film producers, directors, 
actors, dancers, choreographers, not to mention engineers, scientists, researchers and 
intellectuals does not possess the knowledge base to succeed in the Information 
Economy, and must depend on ideas produced elsewhere.   
This changing reality has, in an unexpected way, vindicated the arguments of 
societies that sought to protect their content enterprises in the name of cultural survival 
and sovereignty.  They were right, though it is suggested here, for the wrong reasons, 
since it is not the cultural legacy that is at stake, but the capacity to invent and create new 
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creative and innovate forms (see Venturelli, 2000, 1998).  Few nations had any notion, 
even five years ago, that the fate of economy and society would be dependent upon 
creative resources and the capacity to contribute original forms of expression in the 
Information Society.  From this standpoint, then, all nations will need to regard their 
content and creative enterprises, including the creative work force, with at least the same 
value they once ascribed to their metals, mining, minerals, agricultural, heavy 
manufacturing, electronics, and computing industries.  From this standpoint, the approach 
to e-regulation in the three major economic zones of the world--EU, U.S. and East 
Asiais more aligned socio-politically to the regulatory traditions of industrial and post-
industrial economies than it is to the basic requirements of a creative economy. 
 The emergence of ideas as capital, it is argued, necessarily brings creative 
capital to the center of public policy.  The central economic and societal question of the 
Information Society will soon become: how to stimulate innovation, that is to say, 
originality in ideas.  Through careful and intelligent policy initiatives ranging throughout 
all social levels, governments will need to provoke a high level of dynamic innovation in 
the arts, sciences, and imaginative ideas and their integration into an on-line, networked 
world.  
Given the entrenchment of conventional views of communication policy aligned 
with historically evolved socio-political traditions, it appears unlikely in the medium term 
that the industrialized nations will re-conceptualize their approaches to the 
communication and information system.  It would require a fundamental shift in 
approach to knowledge, participation, education, and the social value of the arts and 
intellectual ideas.  Despite grave inadequacies in traditional approaches to thinking about 
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creativity and knowledge in the modern age (see Venturelli 2001, 2000), there may have 
been little policy incentive historically to reshape the creativity and innovation policy 
debate and account for its missing dimensions.  Yet the information technology 
revolution has already altered the stakes and made content policy the precondition of how 
to ensure a creative and innovative society.  
What does this challenge involve in terms of public policy?  It means an 
educational system that places emphasis on creative freedom and on incentives for 
independent thinking; state and private sector investment in research and development of 
new ideas and technology; and low levels of risk and high levels of reward for creative 
risk-taking in the workplace and the economy.  Most of all, forging an environment of 
creative dynamism requires regulatory stimulation of creative enterprises, i.e., those 
enterprises whose products are ideas.  It is suggested here that an effective policy 
framework would, at the very least:  (1) broaden access to capital from conventional and 
unconventional sources; (2) lower taxation on creative risk-taking; (3) remove content 
obligations and liabilities for all entities that produce and distribute expression; (4) ensure 
that a constant stream of new ideas and cultural forms trickle into the public domain 
through fair use access protections; and (5) assure reasonable, though not excessive 
intellectual property rights for innovation in ideas, technology, and science (see 
Venturelli, 20001, 2000, 1999, 1998a).   
 
Measured by the standards of the role of public policy in promoting favorable 
conditions for creativity and innovation, none of the three regions examined in this paper 
can be said to have found the most effective pathway to e-regulation in the Information 
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Society.  It may be fanciful to expect at this time that the international system and leading 
economies which remain tied to the industrial model of economy and society, will 
recognize the creative, developmental, and democratic functions of expression and 
information networks.  But it is also inevitable that the Information Society will have to 
confront the social, cultural, and political effects of profound imbalances and inequalities 
resulting from ill-conceived policies titled in favor of an industrial view of creative 
production.  Changes in our thinking of what is creativity, innovation, and their basis in 
the structure of expression, may eventually be forced upon the international system from 
the high cost some societies will eventually pay for stifling innovation by failing to 
secure, through appropriate policies, the underlying conditions of a creative economy and 
a knowledge society. 
As the economics of ideas and expression are recognized to play a central and 
strategic role in everything we do, from politics to banking, from education to 
consumption, from the organization of the state and the socio-legal system to 
organization of culture and self-identity, it will become impossible to defend the current 
design of an information age grounded in industrial economics, and traditional concepts 
of creativity and knowledge.  Whether answering the challenge and closing the gap takes 
a few years or a century, the historical pressures to revise our approach to these issues is a 
certainty. Now or in the future, the worlds leading economies will one day find 
themselves on the threshold of an international political settlement to resolve these 
fundamental principles of a Creative Economy and Information Society.  The question is, 
which nation will transform its domestic policy first and lead the international debate, and 
which will be surpassed in innovative capacities, forced to spend decades catching up 
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through costly misjudgments. 
References 
 
Commission of the European Communities (2000a).  Commission gives conditional  
approval to AOL/Time Warner merger.  European Commission press release,  
Ip/00/1145, October 11, 2000. 
__________ (2000b).  EC Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on  
certain legal aspects of Information Society services, in particular electronic  
commerce in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), ECO  
419/CONSOM 80/CODEC 826, 14263/1/99, 98/0325 (COD). 
__________ (1999).  Principles and guidelines for the Communitys audiovisual policy in  
the digital age.  Communication from the Commission to the Council, the  
European Parliament, the Economic & Social Committee and the Committee of  
the Regions, COM(1999)657 final. 
_________ (1995a).  EC Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the  
Council on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal  
data and on the free movement of such data, OJL 281/31, 23.11.1995. 
_________ (1995b).  Proposal for a Council Decision adopting a multi-annual  
Community programme to stimulate the development of a European multimedia  
content industry and to encourage the use of multimedia content in the emerging  
information society, COM (95) 149 final, June 30, 1995. 
__________ (1994).  Europe and the global information society, Bangemann Task  
Force Report to the European Council, Cordis, Supplement 2, 15 July: 4-31, 
Brussels: European Commission, DGXIII/D-2. 
Venturelli 2
_________ (1993a).  Council Directive on the coordination of certain rules concerning  
copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and  
cable retransmission, 93/83/EEC, OJL 248/15, 6.10.93. 
__________ (1993b).  Treaty on European Union (signed  
in Maastricht on 7 February 1992), in European Union: Selected Instruments  
taken from the treaties, book I, vol. I, pp. 11-89.  Luxembourg: Office for Official  
Publications of the European Communities. 
__________ (1993c).  White Paper on growth, competitiveness, and employment: the  
challenges and ways forward into the 21st century (the Delors White Paper),  
COM (93) 700 final. 
__________ (1989).  Council Directive on the coordination of certain provisions laid  
down by law, regulation or administrative action in member states concerning the  
pursuit of television broadcasting activities, 89/552/EEC; OJL 298/23, October  
17, 1989. 
European Parliament (1989).  Report on the European Communitys film and television  
industry (the De Vries Report), January 9, 1989, PE 119.192/final. 
French Government (2000a).  Address by Prime Minister Lionel Jospin at the 20th  
Summer Forum on Communication, Hourtin, August 26, 1999. 
__________ (2000b).  France in the Information Society.  Newsletter of the French  
Government, February 1999, Special Edition. 
Godwin, Mike (1998).  Cyber Rights: Defending Free Speech in the Digital Age.   
New York: Random House. 
Hayek, Friedrich A. von (1944/1994).  The Road to Serfdom.  Chicago: University of  
Venturelli 3
Chicago Press. 
Hegel, G.W.F. (1821/1952).  The Philosophy of Right, trans. T. M. Knox.  Oxford, UK:   
Oxford University Press. 
Hobbes, Thomas (1651/1991).  Leviathan, ed. R. Tuck.  Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge  
University Press. 
Horwitz, Robert B. (1989).  The Irony of Regulatory Reform.  New York: Oxford  
University Press. 
Kant, Immanuel (1784-97/1991).  Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss, trans. H. B. Nisbet.   
Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press. 
Killian, Johnny H. and Costello, George A. (eds.), (1996).  The Constitution of the  
United States of America: Analysis and Interpretation.  Prepared by the  
Congressional Research Service.  Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing  
Office. 
Kim, K. S. & Roemer, R. (1979).  Growth and Structural Transformation.  Cambridge,  
MA:  Harvard University Press. 
Krol, Ed (1992).  The Whole Internet: Users Guided Catalogue.  Sebastopol, Calif:   
OReilly & Associates. 
Lasok, D. and Stone, P. A. (1987), Conflict of Laws in the European Community.   
Abingdon, UK: Professional Books Ltd. 
Lessig, Lawrence (1999).  Code and Other laws of Cyberspace.  New York: Basic Books. 
Locke, John (1690/1960).  Two Treatises of Government, introd., P. Laslett.   
New York: Cambridge University Press. 
OECD (2000).  Regulatory reform in Korea.  Paris: OECD Publications. 
Venturelli 4
Montesquieu, Charles de Secondat (1748/19 89).  The Spirit of the Laws, trans. A. M.  
Cohler, eds. B. C. Miller & H. S. Stone.  Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University  
Press. 
Nishimizu, M. & Robinson, S. (1984).  Trade Policies and Productivity Change in Semi- 
industrialized Countries.  Journal of Development Economics, 16: 177-206. 
Rousseau, Jean Jacques (1755/1973).  The Social Contract and Discourses, trans. G. D.  
H. Cole.  London:  Everymans Library. 
Segal, Ben M. (1995).  A Short History of Internet Protocols at CERN.  CERN PDP- 
NS document available at http://wwwinfo.cern.ch/pdp/ns/ben/TCPHIST.html 
Smith, Adam (1776/1986).  The Wealth of Nations, Books I-III, introd. by A. Skinner.   
London: Penguin. 
South Korean Government (1999a).  Electronic Commerce Act.   
__________ (1999b).  Digital Signature Act. 
_________ (1999c).  Act on the Promotion and Protection of the Information  
Infrastructure. 
Tsao, Y. (1985).  Growth without Productivity: Singapore manufacturing in the 1970s.   
Journal of Development Economics, 18: 25-38. 
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. United States, 99 U.S. 700 (1978). 
U.S. Congress (1998).  Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Public Law 105-304, 112  
Statute 2860. 
________ (1996).  Telecommunications Act of 1996, Public Law No. 104-1-4, 110  
 Stat.56 
U.S. Government (1999).  Electronic commerce: Trade policy in a borderless world,  
Venturelli 5
speech by U.S. Trade Representative Charlene Barshefsky, July 29, 1999. 
_________ (1995).  Global information infrastructure: Agenda for cooperation.  
 Information Infrastructure Task Force, February.  Washington, DC: U.S.
 Government Printing Office. 
________ (1993).  The national information infrastructure: agenda for action. 
 Information Infrastructure Task Force, September.  Washington, DC: U.S. 
 Government Printing Office. 
United States Internet Council (2000).  State of the Internet 2000.  Washington, DC:   
 United State Internet Council & ITTA Inc. 
Venturelli, Shalini (2001).  From the Information Economy to the Creative Economy.  
Forthcoming Monograph from the Brookings Institution & the Center  
for Arts and Culture, Washington, DC. 
________ (2000). Ownership of Cultural Expression: The Place of Free Speech &  
Culture in the New Intellectual Property Rights Regime of the European Union.   
Telematics & Informatics: An International Journal on Telecommunications &  
Information Technology, Special Issue: The Socio-Cultural Consequences of the  
European Information Society, 17(1&2): 9-38. 
__________ (1999).  Information Society & Multilateral Agreements: Obstacles for  
Developing Countries. Media Development, Special Issue: Key Issues in Global  
Communications, 66(2): 22-27. 
___________ (1998a).  Liberalizing the European Media: Politics, Regulation & the  
Public Sphere.  Oxford, UK:  Oxford University Press. 
__________ (1998b).  Cultural Rights and World Trade Agreements in the Information  
Venturelli 6
Society,  Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies, volume  
60(1), pp. 47-76. 
____________(1997a).  Information Liberalization in the European Union, in National  
Information Infrastructure Initiatives: Vision & Policy Design, eds. Kahin, B. &  
Wilson, E, pp. 457-489.  Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press. 
___________ (1997b).  Information Liberalization and the Restructuring of  
 International Relations, in A. Malek and K. Wiegand (eds.), News Media and  
Foreign Policy.  Norwood, NJ: Ablex. 
Yuhn, Ky-Hyang & Kwon, Jene K. (2000).  Economic Growth and Productivity: A case  
study of South Korea.  Applied Economics, 32: 13-23. 
 
 
 
